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There is no evidence comparing head-to-head the effects of monetary incentives to act and to abstain
from acting on behaviour. We present an experiment, conducted between June and September 2012, that
directly compares the effects of those two different monetary incentive schemes on eating behaviour: we
evaluate incentives to eat against incentives not to eat. A large number of participants (n ¼ 353) had
bowls of sweets next to them while they watched different videos over two experimental sessions that
were two days apart. Sweets eating was monitored and monetary incentives to eat or not to eat were
introduced during one of the videos for participants randomly allocated to these conditions. Our results
show that, while both types of incentives were effective in changing sweets-eating behaviour when they
were in place, only incentives not to eat had signiﬁcant carryover effects after they were removed. Those
effects were still signiﬁcant two days after the monetary incentives had been eliminated. We also present
some additional results on personality and health-related variables that shed further light on these ef-
fects. Overall, our study shows that incentives not to eat can be more effective in producing carryover
effects on behaviour in domains like the one explored here.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The use of incentives to motivate people lies at the heart of
economics (Smith, 1776; Barnard, 1938; Camerer and Hogarth,
1999; Laffont and Martimort, 2002). Recently, ﬁnancial incentives
have been used in a variety of research and policy contexts to
induce behaviour change in health-related settings, such as
smoking cessation (Volpp et al., 2006, 2009), dieting (Volpp et al.,
2008; John et al., 2011; John et al., 2012; Kullgren et al., 2013),
exercising (Charness and Gneezy, 2009), and the consumption of
fruit and vegetables (Cooke et al., 2011). These studies have typi-
cally found that monetary incentives are able to induce signiﬁcant
changes in health behaviour, at least in the short run (Marteau et al.,
2009; Gneezy et al., 2011; Volpp et al., 2011; Galizzi, 2014).
Behavioural research, however, has also uncovered a series ofmics, G09 Cowdray House,
zi).
r Ltd. This is an open access articleeffects and principles that are more complex than the mere impact
on the targeted behaviour. Financial incentives, in particular, have
been associated to unintended effects and ‘hidden costs’ (Fehr and
List, 2004) such as the crowding out of intrinsic motivation (Frey
and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Deci et al., 1999; Fehr and Falk, 2002);
changes in social norms or individual beliefs about social norms
(Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a,b; Heyman and Ariely, 2004); the
interaction with reciprocity (Fehr and Gachter, 1997; Rigdon, 2009;
Dur et al., 2010); reputational concerns (Benabou and Tirole, 2006;
Ariely et al., 2009a); or social comparison (Gachter and Thoni, 2010;
Greiner et al., 2011).
Studies have also started exploring the unintended ‘spillover’
effects of incentives on behaviours other than the ones directly
targeted (Wisdom et al., 2010; Dolan and Galizzi, 2014, 2015), or the
conditions under which they adversely lead to ‘choking under
pressure’ (Ariely et al., 2009b). To complicate things further,
existing studies have examined either incentives to act or to abstain
from acting in certain ways, but not both of them together in the
same study. This makes it difﬁcult to compare systematically the
consequences of these different incentive schemes, including whatunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Such a comparison is of key interest for health policy purposes,
as in real world applications incentives will often need to be
removed at some point, and both paying to act and paying to
abstain from acting could have potential backﬁre effects once
removed. For example, we could pay people not to eat fat foods for
some time and then remove the incentive. This could result in
reduced calorie intake if the intervention helps people build up
healthier eating habits, but, based on what we know about moti-
vation, it could also potentially increase the consumption of calorie
dense foods if it undermines people's intrinsic motivation to con-
trol their eating in the absence of incentives. An alternative option
would be, for instance, to pay people to eat low-fat food items and
then remove the incentive. The precise results of these alternative
interventions would depend on many factors, but in order to be
able to compare directly the merits of incentives to act and to
abstain from acting, we need a clean comparison using exactly the
same target behaviour and environment.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper presents the ﬁrst
controlled head-to-head study of the effects of monetary incentives
to act and to abstain from acting on behaviour. We focus on eating
behaviour, which is an issue of signiﬁcant health policy relevance,
and which has already received attention in previous studies of
incentives (Jeffery et al., 1993; Cooke et al., 2011; Grubliauskiene
et al., 2012; Remington et al., 2012; Wengreen et al., 2013). In
particular, we look at sweets eating because it is an ambivalent,
stylised health-related behaviour: while eating sweets is a plea-
surable, tempting activity, it may be potentially harmful, and even
unwanted at a meta level. Many other risky health behaviours, such
as alcohol drinking and unsafe sex, share this same common
feature of being ambivalent activities. Incentives for sweets eating,
moreover, can be readily manipulated in the lab.
We conducted a laboratory experiment in which participants
had bowls of sweets next to them while they watched different
videos over two sessions set two days apart. During the ﬁrst session
we introduced monetary incentives to eat or not to eat sweets from
the bowl and monitored how that affected eating behaviour while
the incentives were in place, after they were removed on the same
day, and two days after they were removed.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes
the method used; Section 3 presents the results obtained; Section 4
concludes with a discussion of the limitations and of the research
and policy implications.2. Method
2.1. Experimental design and procedures
The general methodology used in our experiment was to leave
bowls of sweets (Jelly Beans) next to the participants while they
watched different videos on individual computer screens during
two experimental sessions set two days apart. Sweets eating was
monitored throughout the two sessions, and monetary incentives
to eat or not to eat sweets were introduced during one of the videos
in the ﬁrst session to observe their effects on eating behaviour.
Each participant watched a total of four different videos indi-
vidually, with a bowl of Jelly Beans next to them (approximately
2.2 kcal and 1.14 g per Jelly Bean). Three of the videos were in the
ﬁrst experimental session, while the fourth videowas in the second
session. During the ﬁrst video, we let participants take sweets from
the bowl and eat them as they pleased. We explicitly told people
that they could eat sweets from the bowl as they liked. Before
starting the second video, we implemented one of the three
following conditions and informed participants about it:1) “Control” condition: Participants could keep on eating sweets as
they liked during the next video.
2) “Eat” condition: Participants received £3 at the end of the session
if they ate at least 10 Jelly Beans during the next video.
3) “Don't Eat” condition: Participants received £3 if they did not eat
any Jelly Beans during the next video.
Before the third and fourth videos, participants (in all the con-
ditions) were informed again that they could eat sweets as they
liked during the videos. Table 1 summarizes the structure of the
different experimental conditions.
The ﬁrst, third and fourth videos were approximately 10 min
long and the second video approximately 5 min long. The main
reason for the shorter length of the second video was that we hy-
pothesized that 5 min would be enough to establish the incentive
structure, and we wanted to avoid inducing people in the Eat
condition to eat too many sweets, or a number of sweets that was
too low for 10 min. In the other videos, 10 min provided more time
to obtain good observations. All the videos were selected to be
mildly boring, so that they tended to encourage sweets eating
(Abramson and Stinson,1977; Macht, 2008). The ﬁrst video showed
a bus journey through London ﬁlmed from inside the bus; the
second video explained brieﬂy the history of sweets in the UK (this
topic was chosen to make the incentive manipulation during the
second video a bit more coherent); the third video explained the
bus system in London in the 1950s; the fourth videowas a fragment
from a documentary about animals.
After each video, the participants were asked to move to a
different roomwhere they answered a few simple questions about
the content of the video and how they felt about it. Meanwhile,
unbeknownst to them, the bowls of sweets were weighted with
professional scales by the research assistants, and the measure-
ments recorded to monitor eating behaviour. After answering the
questions, subjects were asked go back to their computers for the
next video, and also informed of any incentive that would be in
place during the video.
This designwas intended to allow for an analysis of the effects of
the two different incentive schemes used while they were in place
(during Video 2), immediately after they were removed (during
Video 3), and also two days later (during Video 4). An obvious
complication with the effects observed immediately after the in-
centives were removed is that the different amounts of sweets
eaten during the video with incentives can affect subjects' appetite
in the next video. Nevertheless, as the results will show, it is still
possible to extract interesting insights from eating behaviour dur-
ing Video 3. In addition, sweets-eating behaviour during Video 4
provides a clean test of the carryover effects of the monetary in-
centives used.
In the ﬁrst experimental session, before starting with the ﬁrst
video, participants responded to various questionnaires intended to
elicit additional personality and health-related information. The
questionnaires included the following elements:
1) Big Five Inventory (John et al., 1991; John et al., 2008), to mea-
sure the Big Five personality dimensions (Extraversion, Agree-
ableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness).
2) Health and Taste Attitudes Questionnaire (Roininen et al., 1999),
which measures six factors that can be grouped into two main
categories. The factors are: “Health Interest”, “Light Product
Interest”, “Natural Product Interest”, “Craving for Sweet Foods”,
“Using Food as a Reward”, and “Pleasure”. The ﬁrst three factors
can be grouped in the category “Healthiness” and the last three
in the category “Taste”, which are intended to capture, respec-
tively, attitudes towards the healthiness and the taste of food.
3) A question about the frequency of sweets intake.
Table 1
Structure of the different experimental conditions.
Session 1 Session 2
Video 1: 10 min Video 2: 5 min Video 3: 10 min Video 4: 10 min
Eat Condition No incentive Incentive to eat No incentive No incentive
Don't Eat Condition No incentive Incentive not to eat No incentive No incentive
Control Condition No incentive No incentive No incentive No incentive
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5) Two questions about height and weight to calculate the Body
Mass Index of the participants.2.2. Participants and experimental sessions
A total of 353 subjects participated in 35 experimental sessions.
On their arrival to the lab, subjects were identiﬁed anonymously by
using an ID code assigned by the online recruitment system
(SONA), and theywere asked to read an informed consent form and
sign it if they agreed to carry on with the experiment. All subjects
who came to the lab gave their consent and decided to take part in
the experiment.We then asked people to draw a number at random
to determine their cubicle in the lab, and participants in each ses-
sionwere randomly assigned to either the Control group, or the Eat
or Don't Eat conditions. Randomization resulted in 133 subjects in
the Eat condition, 112 in the Don't Eat condition and 108 in the
Control condition. Attrition from the ﬁrst day of the experiment to
the second was 11%, so that the number of participants in the
second session was 314.
The experimental protocol was approved by the LSE Research
Ethics Committee, and by the Board of Directors of the Centre for
the Study of Incentives in Health (CSIH), which funded the exper-
iment. All experimental sessions were run at the LSE Behavioural
Research Lab (BRL) between June and September 2012. Subjects
were recruited from the volunteers in the BRL subject pool, which
comprises about 5000 subjects, mostly current and former students
of the University of London. There were no other eligibility or
exclusion criteria to select participants. In the invitation email,
subjects were not informed about the exact nature of the experi-
ment that would be conducted. They were simply told in advance
that the experiment would require coming to the lab for two
separate sessions on two different days of the week (Monday and
Wednesday); that each session would last about an hour; that they
would receive a ﬁxed amount of £20 for their participation in both
sessions (in addition to any amount won during the sessions); and
that they would have the opportunity to get an extra payment
related to their tasks. Exact experimental instructions and any
other materials used in the experiment are available from the au-
thors upon request.
3. Results
Table 2 summarises the main results of the experiment. It
contains the average number of Jelly Beans eaten, and the standard
deviation, in each condition and each video. It also includes the
total number of sweets eaten over the four videos, and the differ-
ence between the sweets eaten in Video 4 and in Video 1 (Video 4-
1). Finally, Table 2 also shows the results of t-tests comparing the
two incentive conditions with the control group.
As Table 2 shows, there were no signiﬁcant differences in
sweets-eating behaviour between the conditions during Video 1,
which conﬁrms that there were no signiﬁcant sample biases. Dur-
ing Video 2, while the incentives were in place, the patternsobtained were exactly as expected. The Eat condition showed
clearly the highest number of sweets eaten, followed by the Control
condition and then the Don't Eat condition. All these differences are
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level: the monetary incentives to
eat and not to eat were both effective in modifying behaviour in the
expected direction while they were in place.
The most interesting results come from Video 3 and especially
Video 4. In Video 3, right after the incentives were removed, the
Don't Eat condition shows the lowest number of Jelly Beans eaten,
followed quite closely by the Eat condition and then the Control
condition. The difference between Don't Eat and Control (the two
most extreme values here) is statistically signiﬁcant, but the dif-
ference between Eat and Control (or between Eat and Don't Eat) is
not. The most noteworthy result in Video 3 is that people ate
signiﬁcantly less sweets in the Don't Eat condition than in the
Control condition. This result is the opposite of what would be
expected on the grounds of the appetite state of the subjects: given
that people in the Don't Eat condition ate fewer sweets during
Video 2, they should have undermined their appetite less. There-
fore, one would expect that subjects in the Don't Eat condition
would eat more, not less, during the next video. Thus, this result
shows a clear carryover effect of the incentives not to eat on sub-
sequent behaviour in the same experimental session.
In Video 4, the results show that people ate considerably fewer
sweets two days later in the Don't Eat condition than in the Control
and the Eat conditions. The difference is statistically signiﬁcant at
5% when comparing with the Eat condition and at 10% when
comparing with the Control condition. This pattern is also clearly
observed in the difference between the sweets eaten in Video 4 and
in Video 1. While subjects in the Control and the Eat conditions ate
more sweets in Video 4 than in Video 1, the subjects in the Don't Eat
condition ate slightly less. In this case, the pattern is signiﬁcant at
1% when comparing with the Eat condition and at 5% when
comparing with the Control condition. This result shows a clear
carryover effect of the incentives not to eat, which affected sweets-
eating behaviour two days after the incentives were removed. The
result is particularly striking given that participants were only
exposed to the monetary incentives for 5 min two days before. On
the contrary, the behaviour of people in the Eat condition was
indistinguishable from the Control condition two days later.
To complement these patterns, Table 3 shows the results of a
formal regression analysis. In a ﬁrst set of regressions (Models 1e5),
we stack the four videos together and treat the data as a panel with
four time observations per subject. We use pooled panel (popula-
tion-averaged) Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions with
robust standard errors clustered at the subject level to account for
individual heterogeneity, and for the fact that error terms can be
potentially correlated across videos for the same subject. The
dependent variable in all the pooled OLS regressions is the number
of Jelly Beans eaten during the different videos, while the explan-
atory variables in the various speciﬁcations include: dummies for
the Eat and Don't Eat conditions; dummies for Video2, Video3, and
Video4; treatmentevideo interaction terms (e.g., Eat*V2 is the
interaction term for the sweets eaten during Video 2 in the Eat
condition); scores on the ﬁve personality dimensions (PersE, PersA,
Table 2
Average number of Jelly Beans eaten per video and condition.
Video 1 Video 2 Video 3 Video 4 TOTAL Video 4-1
Eat Condition 16.89 (24.86) 14.62*** (13.56) 4.13 (16.29) 24.03 (33.73) 61.59 (64.59) 7.34 (21.86)
Don't Eat Condition 16.98 (23.86) 0.04*** (0.70) 3.09*** (9.48) 16.47* (20.85) 36.22** (45.71) 0.18** (20.31)
Control Condition 15.66 (20.77) 5.88 (8.46) 6.92 (11.31) 23.14 (32.10) 52.88 (67.28) 6.92 (20.14)
OVERALL 16.54 (23.30) 7.32 (11.33) 4.64 (13.01) 21.43 (29.68) 50.86 (60.89) 4.82 (21.07)
Notes:
Standard deviations in parentheses.
Results of t-tests comparing the incentive conditions to the control group: *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
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ness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness, respectively);
scores for the twomain categories of the Health and Taste Attitudes
Questionnaire (HTAQ) (Healthiness and Taste, increasing with the
degree of concern for the healthiness and the taste of food,
respectively); self-reported frequency of sweets intake (Sweet-
sIntake); self-declared intention to lose weight (LoseWeight); and
calculated scores for the Body Mass Index (BMI).
The ﬁnal regression (Model 6) uses the number of Jelly Beans
eaten during Video 1 as the dependent variable, and it is simply
meant to give a sense of how the personality and health-related
variables affected sweets eating in the absence of any effects of
monetary incentives. The explanatory variables are the same as
above, with the exception of the treatment dummies (and of course
of the video dummies and interaction terms). Estimates in this case
are obtained using a standard OLS regression adjusting the
variance-covariance matrix for possible heteroskedasticity.
The results of the baseline pooled panel OLS regression (Model
1) conﬁrm signiﬁcant and negative effects of the Don't Eat inter-
action terms: subjects assigned to the incentives not to eat, ate
signiﬁcantly fewer Jelly Beans than participants in the control
group, not only during Video 2 but also in Videos 3 and 4. On the
other hand, there are no signiﬁcant interaction effects for the
subjects in the Eat condition, apart from the obvious one for Video
2. Finally, while the main treatment dummies are not signiﬁcant,Table 3
Regression analysis for sweets eaten during the videos.
Sweets eating Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Eat 1.229 (2.942) 0.765 (2.950) 2.357 (3.224
Don't eat 1.324 (3.015) 0.051 (3.102) 1.029 (3.236
Video 2 9.777*** (1.516) 9.859*** (1.532) 10.23*** (1
Video 3 8.741*** (1.405) 8.802*** (1.414) 8.936*** (1
Video 4 7.632*** (2.100) 7.276*** (2.073) 7.592*** (2.1
Eat*V2 7.507*** (2.635) 7.683*** (2.678) 7.135** (2.89
Eat*V3 4.018 (3.234) 3.913 (3.289) 5.235 (3.58
Eat*V4 0.494 (3.250) 0.435 (3.268) 1.179 (3.44
Don't Eat*V2 7.168*** (2.718) 6.934** (2.784) 6.884** (2.9
Don't Eat*V3 5.151** (2.402) 4.852** (2.446) 4.656* (2.5
Don't Eat*V4 8.145*** (2.930) 7.832*** (2.933) 8.247*** (3
PersE 1.059 (2.524)
PersA 5.306** (2.944)
PersC 3.488 (3.494)
PersN 5.981** (2.348)
PersO 4.702* (2.581)
Healthiness 0.219* (0.118
Taste 0.014 (0.093
SweetsIntake
LoseWeight
BMI
Constant 15.66*** (1.999) 11.18 (14.49) 2.562 (11.3
Observations 1372 1216 1216
R-squared 0.126 0.185 0.129
Notes:
*, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Models 1e5 are pooled panel OLS regressions with SE clustered at subject level.
Model 6 is heteroskedasticity-robust OLS regression for Video 1.the effects of the time dummies are as expected: compared to the
ﬁrst video, subjects across all conditions tended to eat fewer Jelly
Beans in Video 2 (which was only 5 min long) and in Video 3, and
more in Video 4 (two days later).
When the scores on the ﬁve personality dimensions are added
as controls in the pooled OLS regression (Model 2), the estimates
show signiﬁcant and positive effects of Agreeableness and Neuroti-
cism, and a signiﬁcant negative effect for Openness. Importantly, the
previously described effects of the Don't Eat interaction terms are
fully conﬁrmed: subjects previously paid not to eat continued
eating signiﬁcantly less in Videos 3 and 4.
The effects of these interaction terms are also robust to using as
alternative controls the variables for the HTAQ dimensions (Model
3), self-reported frequency of sweets intake, self-declared intention
to lose weight, and individual BMI (Model 4). Curiously, self-
reported concern for the Healthiness of food had a positive effect
on sweets eating. Frequency of sweets intake and BMI had also
positive effects, and desire to lose weight a negative one: subjects
with higher BMI and who usually eat more sweets also ate more
sweets in the experiment, while people who had a desire to lose
weight ate less.
Results are qualitatively unaltered when all control variables are
introduced simultaneously in the pooled OLS regression (Model 5):
subjects assigned to the Don't Eat condition continue eating
signiﬁcantly less than in the control group in Videos 3 and 4Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
) 1.854 (2.885) 3.161 (3.084)
) 1.841 (2.975) 1.092 (3.132)
.606) 9.859*** (1.530) 10.23*** (1.612)
.492) 8.881*** (1.416) 8.961*** (1.491)
62) 7.336*** (2.069) 7.218*** (2.122)
6) 7.683*** (2.676) 7.135** (2.906)
6) 3.834 (3.289) 5.211 (3.593)
2) 0.436 (3.277) 0.839 (3.391)
58) 6.934** (2.782) 6.884** (2.968)
82) 4.773* (2.446) 4.633* (2.585)
.156) 7.786*** (2.938) 7.948** (3.120)
1.916 (2.812) 3.781 (4.090)
5.865* (3.089) 2.893 (4.404)
3.976 (3.599) 5.172 (4.826)
4.946** (2.318) 7.307** (3.145)
5.738** (2.765) 7.156* (3.962)
) 0.221** (0.112) 0.433*** (0.161)
) 0.047 (0.084) 0.035 (0.124)
1.813*** (0.611) 1.921*** (0.689) 3.615*** (1.145)
0.828** (0.419) 0.698 (0.454) 1.369** (0.674)
0.907*** (0.309) 0.955*** (0.312) 1.357*** (0.476)
5) 0.236 (6.765) 39.84* (23.02) 49.65 (31.26)
1339 1216 312
0.153 0.185 0.113
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level).
It is important to note that the results of the pooled OLS re-
gressions reported above are broadly conﬁrmed when using
random effects panel models; when all variables are standardized
to minimize multicollinearity issues potentially arising from the
interaction terms; and when regressions are replicated excluding
the three subjects in the sample who suffered from diabetes (these
additional analyses are available from the authors on request). The
results of the ﬁnal OLS regression (Model 6) show that the main
personality inﬂuence on sweets eating was Neuroticism, which
might suggest that people who tended to get more anxious during
the videos ate more sweets. Also Openness seems to have had some
inﬂuence on eating behaviour, with more open people eating fewer
sweets, but the effect is only signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The
regression also conﬁrms the positive effects described above for the
self-reported concern for the Healthiness of food, frequency of
sweets intake, and BMI, and the negative effect of desire to lose
weight. Also these results are conﬁrmedwhen the OLS regression is
replicated excluding the three subjects in the sample who suffered
from diabetes (analysis also available on request).
Finally, we conduct a split-sample analysis to explore under
which conditions the different incentives affect behaviour, and in
particular whether the ﬁnancial incentives induced consumption in
the ‘under-eaters’ and reduced consumption in the ‘over-eaters’.
This split sample analysis is important for both research and policy
purposes, because one might worry that inducing consumption in
‘under-eaters’ may produce over-eating in people who were
already eating more or that reducing consumption in ‘over-eaters’
may result in under-consumption in people who were consuming
appropriately in the absence of incentives.
In Table 4, we present additional regressions splitting the sam-
ple in two sub-groups, according to whether the initial sweets
consumption in Video 1 was below or above the median con-
sumption. The results for the two subsamples above (Model 1a) and
below (Model 1b) the median consumption, are reported in Table 4,
together with the analogous regression for the whole sample for
the sake of comparison (Model 1). The ﬁndings are of key interest as
they conﬁrm that incentives not to eat primarily had a lasting effect
in the cases where a change in the target behaviour is envisaged the
most, namely the ‘over-eaters’ who ate sweets above the median
level.
First, as in the whole sample, both incentives to eat and not to
eat were effective in changing the eating behaviour of subjects whoTable 4
Regression analysis for sweets eaten during the videos: split sub-samples.
Sweets eating Above median Below median Whole sample
Model 1a Model 1b Model 1
Eat 1.738 (4.641) 0.418 (0.531) 1.229 (2.942)
Don't eat 3.266 (4.708) 0.565 (0.531) 1.324 (3.015)
Video 2 19.15*** (2.465) 0.745 (0.481) 9.777*** (1.516)
Video 3 17.75*** (2.145) 0.137 (0.791) 8.741*** (1.405)
Video 4 7.674** (3.608) 6.545*** (1.968) 7.632*** (2.100)
Eat*V2 6.166 (4.152) 9.684*** (1.955) 7.507*** (2.635)
Eat*V3 7.186 (5.629) 0.121 (1.381) 4.018 (3.234)
Eat*V4 2.153 (5.710) 3.272 (2.246) 0.494 (3.250)
Don't Eat*V2 13.21*** (4.316) 1.325** (0.581) 7.168*** (2.718)
Don't Eat*V3 8.772** (3.813) 1.565* (0.871) 5.151** (2.402)
Don't Eat*V4 12.17** (5.312) 2.290 (2.323) 8.145*** (2.930)
Constant 29.18*** (3.108) 2.618*** (0.422) 15.66*** (1.999)
Observations 686 686 1372
R-squared 0.246 0.161 0.126
Notes:
*, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
All models are pooled panel OLS regressions with SE clustered at subject level.in Video 1 ate sweets below the median level. For subjects who in
Video 1 already ate sweets above the median level, only incentives
not to eat were effective in changing eating behaviour. Second, like
in the whole sample, none of the sub-groups exhibited signiﬁcant
carryover effects of monetary incentives in the Eat condition.
Furthermore, the carryover effects of the incentives not to eat seem
limited to subjects who in Video 1 ate sweets above the median
level. These subjects (but not the ones who ate sweets below the
median level) continued eating signiﬁcantly fewer sweets in Videos
3 and 4.
4. Conclusions
We have investigated the effects of two different types of
monetary incentives on sweets-eating behaviour: incentives to eat
and incentives not to eat. These two incentives schemes have been
widely used in research and policy but they have never been
directly compared head-to-head using the same target behaviour
and the same environment. We found that both types of incentives
were effective in modifying behaviour as expected while they were
in place, but only incentives not to eat had signiﬁcant carryover
effects on eating. People who were paid not to eat sweets for only
5 min, showed reduced sweets eating two days after this incentive
was removed.
One interpretation of these results is that paying people not to
eat helped them to exert and build up their self-control. Then this
improved ability to exert self-control and refrain from engaging in a
behaviour that may be undesirable carried over to subsequent
situations where incentives were absent. On the contrary, paying
people to eat was not so successful in building-up a habit that
carried over to future contexts.
An alternative explanation may be that paying people not to eat
sweets simply primed themwith the notion that not eating sweets
is something good and inﬂuenced subsequent behaviour, while
incentives to eat failed to successfully prime people with the idea
that eating sweets is good. This is consistent with the well docu-
mented ‘bad is stronger than good’ effect, which is the notion that
negative messages are more salient and easier to retain than pos-
itive ones (Baumeister et al., 2001). Similar effects have also been
documented in the context of nutritional food labelling, where
people seem to react more strongly to negative health messages
than to positive ones (Fox et al., 2002).
We also conducted a split-sample analysis to look at whether
the effects of the different types of incentives induced consumption
in the ‘under-eaters’ and reduced consumption in the ‘over-eaters’,
for whom a behavioural change can be desired the most in practical
health-policy applications. The split-sample analysis reassuringly
conﬁrms that incentives not to eat primarily had a lasting effect on
the subjects who ate sweets above the median level. This
strengthens the policy implications, as it indicates that the effects
of monetary incentives to improve poor behaviour do not appear to
have adverse spillover effects on the subjects who are not directly
targeted by the policy.
While our results pertain to a speciﬁc context and should not be
interpreted as general evidence against the carryover effects of
incentives to act, they suggest that incentives to abstain from acting
are likely to have more powerful and long-lasting effects on
behaviour, at least in circumstances that have similar features to
our set-up. What characterizes our set-up is mainly an ambivalent
health situation where subjects can choose to act in a way that is
pleasurable and tempting, but potentially harmful or unwanted at a
deeper level. The same pattern applies to a large number of health
behaviours of high policy relevance, like alcohol drinking and un-
safe sex, which makes our results relevant to these applied areas.
It is worth noting, however, that another relevant category of
P. Dolan et al. / Social Science & Medicine 133 (2015) 153e158158health-related situations is that in which people can choose to act
in a way that is beneﬁcial or desirable, but also costly and effortful,
so that they are tempted to abstain from acting. Such situations
could include behaviours like exercising, eating vegetables, taking a
screening test or vaccination, or going to see the doctor. These
situations are essentially the opposite of our set-up in the sense
that the behaviour that requires self-control is to act instead of to
abstain from acting. In these cases, incentives to act and not to act
are likely to have different consequences.
Based on our results, we would expect that the patterns pro-
duced by incentives to act and to abstain from acting are likely to
reverse, so that incentives to act may have stronger carryover ef-
fects than incentives to refrain from acting. Further research along
these lines is needed to fully uncover the effects of different types of
incentives in these different circumstances.
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